Rational decision-making in mental health: the role of systematic reviews

Author(s):  
Simon M Gilbody ◽  
Mark Petticrew
2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (7) ◽  
pp. 999-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Goll ◽  
Abdul A. Rasheed

This study examines the relationships between top management demographics, rational decision making (RDM), munificence, and firm performance. We expect top management demographics to influence rational decision making, and rational decision making to influence firm performance. In addition, we hypothesize a moderating effect of environmental munificence on the rational decision making-firm performance relationship. To test these hypotheses, we conducted a survey that measured RDM. Top management demographic characteristics, environmental munificence, and firm performance were collected from archival sources. We examined the relationships between RDM and top management age, tenure, and education level, using regression analyses. The results of this study provide support for the assertion that top management demographic characteristics influence decision making, and for the role of environmental munificence as a moderator in the relationship between decision making and organizational performance.


Author(s):  
Tom Boylan ◽  
Paschal O'Gorman

The role of conventions has been an area of increasing interest to writers in the post-Keynesian tradition, particularly over the last thirty years. This has arisen from the reexamination of John Maynard Keynes’s notion of convention in the context of radical uncertainty along with the status of rationality in the face of uncertainty. This chapter discusses some of the principal tenets of Henri Poincaré’s analysis of conventions and relates them to the post-Keynesian methodological agenda, more specifically to provide a Poincaréan defense of the role of conventions in rational decision-making. It argues that this provides an innovative and more adequate philosophical defense of nonergodicity in economic theory, which has become a central axiom of post-Keynesian economics. The chapter first provides an overview of the post-Keynesian literature on uncertainty and conventions arising from Keynes’s employment of the concept. It then outlines the emergence of conventions and conventionalism in philosophy, examines Poincaré’s conventionalism and its relationship with rationality, and considers the implications of Poincaré’s conventionalism for post-Keynesian economics.


Author(s):  
Christopher R. Sheldrick ◽  
Justeen Hyde ◽  
Laurel K. Leslie ◽  
Thomas Mackie

Many of the resources developed to promote the use of evidence in policy aspire to an ideal of rational decision making, yet their basis in the decision sciences is often unclear. Tracing the historical development of evidence-informed policy to its roots in evidence-based medicine (EBM), we distinguish between two understandings of how research evidence may be applied. Advocates for EBM all seek to use research evidence to optimise clinical care. However, some proponents argue that ‘uptake' of research evidence should be direct and universal, for example through wide-scale implementation of ‘evidence-based practices'. In contrast, other conceptualisations of EBM are rooted in expected utility theory, which defines rational decisions as choices that are expected to result in the greatest benefit. Applying this theory to medical care, clinical decision-making models clearly demonstrate that rational decisions require not only a range of relevant evidence, but also expertise to inform judgments regarding the credibility of estimates and to assess fit-to-context, and stakeholder preferences and values to weigh trade-offs among competing outcomes. Using these models as exemplars, we argue that attempts to apply research evidence directly to practice or policy without consideration of expert judgement or preferences and values reflect fundamental misconceptions about the theory of rational decision making that can impede implementation. In turn, the decision sciences highlight the need to consider the role of expertise and judgment when interpreting research evidence, the role of preferences and values when applying it to specific decisions, and the practical limits imposed by the uncertainty inherent in each.<br /><br />key messages<br /><ol><li>Uncertainty is inherent to research evidence and to decision making.</li><br /><li>Rational decisions require judgment to interpret evidence and stakeholder values to apply evidence.</li><br /><li>Decisions can be sensitive to evidence, expertise, and/or preferences and values to varying degrees.</li><br /></ol>


2021 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 15-21
Author(s):  
Rahul Bhui ◽  
Lucy Lai ◽  
Samuel J Gershman

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fritz Breithaupt

This article examines the relation of empathy and rational judgment. When people observe a conflict most are quick to side with one of the parties. Once a side has been taken, empathy with that party further solidifies this choice. Hence, it will be suggested that empathy is not neutral to judgment and rational decision-making. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will necessarily have made the best choice.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arif Ahmed

Evidential Decision Theory is a radical theory of rational decision-making. It recommends that instead of thinking about what your decisions *cause*, you should think about what they *reveal*. This Element explains in simple terms why thinking in this way makes a big difference, and argues that doing so makes for *better* decisions. An appendix gives an intuitive explanation of the measure-theoretic foundations of Evidential Decision Theory.


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